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INTRODUCTION
In 1963, the watershed case of Babcock v. Jackson' set off the American
choice-of-law revolution in state courts by asking the question "[s]hall the law of
the place of the tort invariably govern the availability of relief for the tort or shall
the applicable choice of law rule also reflect a consideration of other factors which
are relevant to the purposes served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy?"2
The Court of Appeals of New York, much to the delight of conflict of laws
scholars, 3 adopted what came to be known as the "most significant relationship"
test.4 This new approach displaced the traditional lex loci delicti choice-of-law
doctrine for torts which had all too often led to "the inexorable application of the
law of the place of the tort where that place ha[d] no reasonable or relevant interest
in the particular issue" disputed in the case.5 The traditional lex loci delicti
approach blindly applied the law of the place of the injury to the dispute with few
exceptions; but the "most significant relationship" test asks the judge to consider
the interests of other jurisdictions in the resolution of the dispute besides just the
interests of the jurisdiction where the plaintiff's injury occurred.6 Since Babcock,
over forty-one jurisdictions have deserted the vested rights theory and the
mechanical use of lex loci delicti for tort conflicts in favor of one of the modem
approaches to choice-of-law questions such as the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws [hereinafter Restatement (Second)] or some form of governmental interest
analysis.
In 1987, Chief Justice Shepard's opinion in Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v.
Greeson8 sought to align Indiana with the majority of jurisdictions that had adopted
the Restatement (Second) in full or in part as their choice-of-law doctrine. 9 The
Indiana Supreme Court wanted to avoid the anomalous results that would be caused
by that application of the traditional lex loci delicti rule; and therefore adopted a
more progressive approach to choice-of-law questions citing section 145(2) of the
1. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
2. Id. at 280-81 (emphasis in original).
3. See generally David F. Cavers et al., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963) (discussing the
importance of the case in the development of the law of conflict of laws). Professor Brainerd
Currie was heartened by Babcock "because as a replacement for the discredited rule it
provides something very much better than the rather-to-be-expected 'center of gravity' or
'grouping of contacts' theory." Id. at 1233. Professor Willis L.M. Reese felt that Judge
Fuld's opinion was "almost certain to have a profound effect upon future developments in
many other areas of choice of law." Id. at 1251.
4. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84.
5. Id. at 283. Lex loci delicti is defined as "[tihe law of the place where the tort was
committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (7th ed. 1999).
6. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 280-82.
7. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REv. 1248, 1251-55 (1997).
8. 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Ind. 1987).
9. Symeonides, supra note 7, at 1268-69. As of 1997, twenty-one states had adopted the
Restatement (Second) as their choice-of-law doctrine for tort conflicts and twenty-five had
done so for contract conflicts. Id. If you add to that group those states that follow the kindred
significant contacts approach and those states that follow the Restatement (Second) in part,
you have a majority of the states following some version of the Restatement (Second). Id.
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Restatement (Second) for a grouping-of-contacts analysis.'0 Although the court has
taken this small step toward adopting the Restatement (Second), the court has
limited the strength of the analysis by considering only the geographical contacts
listed in section 145(2) while ignoring section 145's directive to consider those
contacts in light of the choice-of-law principles laid out in section 6.11 Among
those principles ignored by the Hubbard court were the relevant policies of the
forum and other interested states, the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, and the protection of the justified expectations
of the parties involved.' 2 As discussed below, these principles are inseparable from
a proper application of the Restatement (Second). 13
Indiana must complete its own conflict of laws revolution by adopting the
Restatement (Second) sections dealing with torts in their entirety or at least by
allowing governmental interest analysis to play some role in Indiana's choice-of-
law doctrine. In the process, the court should leave its current approach, the
Hubbard test, behind. In Part I, this Note explains some of the fundamental
theoretical compromises made in drafting the Restatement (Second) that led to
certain difficulties in its application. Further, Part I discusses the principal sections
of the Restatement (Second) dealing with conflicts between competing tort laws
and explains how the sections function together in one harmonious doctrine. Part II
of this Note discusses the Hubbard case, explains how the Hubbard test does not
parallel the Restatement (Second)'s "most significant relationship" test, and
explains the type of test Hubbard actually articulates. Then, the Note documents
Hubbard's legacy by emphasizing the unfulfilled promise of Gollnick v. Gollnick;'
4
by summarizing several subsequent cases that illustrate a small divergence from the
Hubbard test in lower courts; by reviewing Allen v. Great American Reserve
Insurance Co.,' 5 the last word on the Hubbard test; and by previewing Simon v.
United States, 6 in which the Third Circuit has certified questions regarding
Hubbard to the Indiana Supreme Court for review. Part III briefly highlights four
gleaming problems found in the Hubbard test: 1) the test lacks a definitive standard
for when the lex loci delicti approach still applies; 2) the test does not, in practice,
differ significantly from the lex loci delicti approach; 3) the second prong of the
test uses a grouping-of-contacts approach that lacks the Restatement (Second)'s
substantive credibility; and 4) the test does not explain how to choose between
more than one non-situs jurisdiction when the situs has been deemed insignificant.
This Note concludes by suggesting that when deciding Simon v. United States,
Indiana should incorporate the choice-of-law principles found in section 6 of the
Restatement (Second)--most important among them, governmental interest
analysis-into its choice-of-law analysis.
10. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
11. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J.
COMP. L. 457, 460 (1989).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
13. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF
LAWS 212 (3d ed. 2002).
14. 517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
15. 766 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. 2002).
16. 341 F.3d 193 (3d. Cir. 2003), certifying questions to 794 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. 2003).
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I. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
The Restatement (Second) is the most influential choice-of-law doctrine in
modem conflict of laws history. 17 The efforts to draft'the Restatement (Second)
began in 1953 as a response to the growing distaste among academics for the
Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws [hereinafter Restatement (First)] and its
"strong territorial bias."' 8 The final draft, published in 1971, is a "complex,
negotiated settlement among several warring factions of choice-of-law
revolutionaries."' 9 The popularity of this negotiated settlement among American
judges is linked to the deference it gives to courts, its ease of application, its lack of
forum or substantive bias, its broad scope, and the prestige of the American Law
Institute.2 °
A. Understandable Confusion Caused by the Compromise of Schools
The apparent confusion among some courts, such as the Hubbard court,
regarding the proper application of the Restatement (Second) can be traced to the
settlement over the doctrine's methodological foundation. This "methodological
foundation consists of various incongruous elements which were borrowed from
various new theories and forged into an oddly eclectic approach" and is a
"compromise between neutral allocation and policy evaluation.",2' Professor
William L. Reynolds has described the Restatement (Second) as a "curious cross
between vested rights theory and the legal process school. 22 For example, lex loci
delicti and vested rights theory found their way into the Restatement (Second)'s
various presumptive law choices, such as section 146 for personal injuries.2 The
legal process school's "reasoned elaboration," although not as easily recognizable,
17. See Patrick J. Brochers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REv. 1232, 1233 (1997).
18. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 205. The Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws required courts to apply the law of the place of injury when determining whether the
plaintiff had sustained a legal injury, what the applicable standard of care is, what defenses
are available, and so on. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 378-390
(1934).
19. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 205.
20. See Symeonides, supra note 7, at 1269-76.
21. TH. M. DE BOER, BEYOND LEx LOCI DELICTI: CONFLICTS METHODOLOGY AND
MULTISTATE TORTS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW 199 (1987) (offering a Dutch perspective on
American choice-of-law methodology).
22. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REv. 1371,
1386 (1997). Professor Joseph Beale's vested rights theory requires
the application of the law of the jurisdiction where a right "vested." A
tort right vested, for example, in the state where the injury occurred
(rather than, say, where the wrongful conduct occurred); a contract right
vested in the state where the last act necessary to make the contract took
place (usually the acceptance), and so on.
Id. at 1376.
23. Id. at 1387.
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resonates in section 6 and section 145-both of which require policy analysis and
recognition of the reasonable expectations of the parties in a legal dispute. 4
The final version of the Restatement (Second) contains territorial choice-of-law
rules, interest analysis, and grouping-of-contacts.25 Understandably, the inclusion
of these conflicting choice-of-law frameworks has led to confusion in judicial
opinions. Professor Ted M. de Boer pointed out that the Restatement (Second) "has
provided the courts with virtually unlimited license to motivate any choice of law
result they prefer in the phraseology of [the text], which lends a semblance of
legitimacy to even the most dubious decision."2 6 Although Professor de Boer's
comments may have gone too far, a court that does not have a full grasp of how the
"three central elements" work together may be applying only one of these
methodologies while believing that it has applied the Restatement (Second)
correctly.27 A court in a tort dispute can apply interest analysis through section 6,
grouping-of-contacts through section 145, or traditional lex loci delicti through one
of the many presumptive sections while ignoring the rest of the Restatement
(Second). This is not to say that all courts that misapply the Restatement (Second)
do so intentionally; some of their misunderstanding is attributable to the
Restatement (Second) itself.
28
B. Proper Application of the Restatement (Second)'s Key Sections.
Although the Restatement (Second)'s theoretical inconsistencies led some
courts to misapply it, there is a consensus on the drafters' intended application. An
overview of the key sections used in resolving conflicts between competing
jurisdictions' tort laws will be helpful. First, section 6-which sets out the basic
principles of the entire Restatement (Second)-will be discussed, including an
explanation of Professor Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis. Next,
section 145, the general rule for conflicts between tort laws, will be elucidated.
Lastly, the territorial presumptions, a remnant of the traditional lex loci delicti, will
be discussed.
24. Id. at 1387-88 (discussing the ideas found in HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(tentative edition 1954) (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)). A legal
process judge practicing Hart and Sacks' "reasoned elaboration"
must explain her decision; she must elaborate it by showing reasons
why society will be better off than it would be if the decision had gone
otherwise. That explanation must be tied closely to the facts, and it must
reflect shared values. Those values, in turn, can be derived from many
sources: precedents, statutes, or deeply held societal beliefs.
Id. at 1387 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). For examples of what Reynolds
describes as "exemplar cases," see Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) and The T.J.
Hooker, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). Id.
25. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 205-06.
26. DE BOER, supra note 21, at 201.
27. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 214.
28. Id. at 215.
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1. Section 6: Choice-of-Law Principles
"In Section 6, one finds the various policies and choice-of-law values that are
said to underlie all other Sections of the Restatement.,29 Section 6 outlines the
basic choice-of-law principles for a court to consider when making a decision
between competing laws. First, the court is directed to follow any statutory
directive of the forum state on choice-of-law. 30 Where there is no such statute, the
court is instructed to consider the following factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule-of-law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interest of those states in the determination of the particular issues,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 3'
Professors Richman and Reynolds describe section 6 as "the heart of the
Restatement (Second)" and it is referred to in section after section.32 Professors
Scoles, Hay, Borchers, and Symeonides have gone further, stating that "[s]ection 6
is the cornerstone of the entire Restatement," while the "'most-significant-
relationship' formula is the Restatement's other fundamental concept."
33
Factors (b) and (c) of section 6-which incorporate governmental interest
analysis into the Restatement (Second)--are the most important factors to the topic
of this Note. 34 Interest analysis is a product of unilateralist thought.35 Unilateralism
seeks to find the appropriate sovereign, as opposed to making a substantive
decision about which sovereign has the superior law.36 At the same time,
unilateralism also pays close attention to the content of the competing laws.3 7 A
unilateralist looks to see if the actual dispute is of the type that the law was
designed to govern; only then will the law be truly applicable. 3
29. Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on
the Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REV. 653, 659 (1995) (emphasis in original).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971).
31. Id. § 6(2).
32. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 207 (emphasis added).
33. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICTS OF LAW 58 (3d ed. 2000). "While Section 6
enunciates the guiding principles of the choice-of-law process, the most-significant
relationship formula describes the objective of that process: to apply the law of the state that,
with regard to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship with the parties and
the dispute." Id. at 60-61 (emphasis in original).
34. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 207.
35. Gene R. Shreve, Introductory Note, in A CONFLIcT-OF-LAW ANTHOLOGY 71 (Gene
R. Shreve ed., 1997).
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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a. Brainerd Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis
To understand the policy analysis found in section 6, a discussion of Professor
Brainerd Currie's governmental interest analysis is necessary. 39 Currie's approach
to choice-of-law problems recognizes that law is purposive, that it is intended to
achieve various social policies or goals.40 Professor Gene Shreve has provided a
clear summary of how Currie's governmental interest analysis functions:
When a court must choose between conflicting rules of decision, it
should proceed in order through the following series of steps.
1. The first step is to determine how many of the competing laws come
from places that would have an interest in having them applied. So we
must ask regarding each law: do the particular facts of the case
implicate the policies that account for the existence of the law? If so, the
sovereign (law source) who created that rule of law is interested in its
application. On the other hand, if refusal to apply a particular rule of
law would not frustrate the purpose behind its creation, that law source
is uninterested.
2. If only one of the competing laws is from an interested place, the
court should apply that law. It should do so because there is only a false
conflict.
3. If it initially appears that two places might each be interested in
having their conflicting laws applied, there may be a true conflict. But
the court must move carefully before concluding that a true conflict
exists. Specifically, the court should first consider whether (upon closer
39.Id. at 71.
40. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 239. Currie outlined his basic method
along these lines:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should
be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in
the law of the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of the foreign state should furnish
the rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the
governmental policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then
inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to
provide a legitmate basis for the assertion of an interest in the
application of that policy. This process is essentially a familiar one of
construction or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process how
a statute applies in time, and how it applies to marginal domestic
situations, so we may determine how it should be applied to cases
involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy
expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an
interest in the application of its policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application
of its policy, but the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application
of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the
foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy,
and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state
has no such interest.
Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L.J.
171,178.
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examination) a more restrained interpretation of the policies supporting
either one of the competing laws suggest that the source from which the
law is taken is not interested after all. If (through this process of
reconsideration) the number of interested places is reduced to one, [the]
choice is made in the manner indicated in step (2) above. However, if
on further examination, it still appears that a true conflict exists, and if
one of the laws vying for application is that of the forum, the court
should resolve the conflict by applying forum law.
4 1
The overall goal of interest analysis is to see that a law is not applied unless its
application will realize the policy goal intended to be achieved when the sovereign
created it.
4 2
b. Diagramming Interest Analysis
To assist legal scholars in conceptualizing Professor Currie's vision of interest
analysis, Professor William M. Richman produced diagrams that demonstrate
visually how interest analysis works.43 Richman places the relevant contacts, law,
and policy in the appropriate state's column. 44 Then, he uses arrows to show the
relationship of the law's policy to the facts of the case.
Richman's diagram of the landmark case of Babcock v. Jackson is quite
helpful in understanding the role interest analysis plays in choice-of-law
decisions.46 In Babcock, the plaintiff and defendant, both New York residents, were
involved in an automobile accident while traveling in Ontario, Canada.47 The
plaintiff passenger brought suit against the defendant driver in New York. The
choice-of-law problem was a common one: Ontario's guest statute prohibited
passengers from recovering against their drivers, but New York law allowed for
such recovery. 4" The policy behind New York's pro-recovery law was to force a
tortfeasor to compensate his victim.49 Conversely, Ontario sought to prevent
fraudulent claims by passengers colluding with drivers against insurers.50 Under
Currie's interest analysis, Babcock is a false conflict. If New York law is applied,
New York's policy of compensating victims will be advanced by allowing plaintiff,
a New York resident, to recover damages. 51 If Ontario's law is applied, Ontario's
interest in preventing fraud against Ontario insurers will not be advanced because
the defendant, a New York resident, was not insured in Ontario. Interest analysis
dictates that New York law, the only interested law, should be applied. 52
41. Gene R. Shreve & Hannah L; Buxbaum, Cases and Materials on Conflicts of Law
161 (2000) (unpublished casebook, on file with author) (emphasis omitted).
42. RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 239-40.
43. William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding of
Interest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 317, 318-19 (1982).
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Diagram of Babcock v. Jackson53
NEW YORK ONTARIO
CONTACTS Forum Accident
Plaintiff's Domicile Injury
Defendant's Domicile
Car Garaged & Insured
Trip Began
LAW No Guest Statute Guest Statute
POLiCY Compensate Victims Avoid Insurance Fraud"
Richman explains that:
The arrows graphically depict Currie's insight. The arrow from New
York's policy (compensate auto accident victims) points toward a New
York contact: the New York Plaintiff. The arrow from Ontario's policy,
however, does not point toward an Ontario contact. Rather, it crosses
the center line, indicating that the Ontario policy has no Ontario
referent, and thus, that Ontario's interests will not be advanced by the
application of its laws. Since the arrows from both relevant policies
point to contacts in New York, the case is a false conflict.
54
Richman uses the case of Lilienthal v. Kaufman 55 to illustrate Currie's true
conflict scenario. In Lilienthal, the defendant, adjudicated a spendthrift in
Oregon,56 contacted the plaintiff in San Francisco for a loan to finance a joint
venture.57 The defendant spendthrift's guardian declared the obligation void
causing the plaintiff to bring suit in Oregon.5 8 While California law did not
recognize the status of spendthrift and would have enforced the contract, Oregon
law held the contract voidable.59 Oregon was interested in protecting the
spendthrift's family and protecting the state's own funds from being used to pay for
public assistance.6 California was interested in enforcing a contract created in
California and providing a remedy for one of its residents.
6 1
53. Id.
54. Id. at 319-20.
55. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
56. A spendthrift is "[o]ne who spends lavishly and wastefully; a profligate." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1408 (7th ed. 1999).
57. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545.
58. Id. at 544.
59. Id. at 545.
60. RICHMAN, supra note 43, at 320-31.
61. Id. at 321.
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
Diagram of Lilienthal v. Kaufman62
CALIFORNIA OREGON
CONTACTS Plaintiff's Domicile Forum
Contract Made Defendant's Domicile
Contract To Be Performed Defendant's Guardian
Defendant's Family4+ "
LAW No Spendthrift Statute Spendthrift Statute
POLICY Ensure Security of Contracts Protect Spendthrift's
Family & Public Funds
Richman explains:
The diagram helps to show the true conflict. California's policy arrow
points toward a California contact, thus indicating that the application
of California law would advance its policy interests. Similarly,
Oregon's policy refers to an Oregon contact; that state's interests would
also be advanced by the application of its law. The court, following
Currie's 63program for resolving true conflicts, applied the law of
Oregon.
c. Interest Analysis in Section 6
Although the drafters did not incorporate Professor Currie's interest analysis
into the Restatement (Second) in its entirety, interest analysis was explicitly
included in section 6(2)(b) and (c), which reference the relevant policies of the
forum and other interested states. The comments that follow section 6 expound on
this:
Every rule of law, whether embodied in a statute or in a common law
rule, was designed to achieve one or more purposes. A court should
have regard for these purposes in determining whether to apply its own
rule or the rule of another state in the decision of a particular issue....
In determining a question of choice of law, the forum should give
consideration not only to its own relevant polices ... but also to the
relevant policies of all other interested states. The forum should seek to
reach a result that will achieve the best possible accommodation of
these polices. The forum should also appraise the relative interests of
the states involved in the determination of the particular issue. In
general, it is fitting that the state whose interests are most deeply
affected should have its local law applied.
64
62. Id.; 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
63. Id. at 321-22.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) cmt. e, f (1971).
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A striking difference between section 6 of the Restatement (Second) and Currie's
interest analysis is that the Restatement (Second) chose to abandon Currie's forum
presumption. 65 It should also be noted that unlike Currie, the Restatement
(Second)'s drafters did not outline a specific method for courts to follow when
analyzing competing state interests.
2. Section 145: The General Principle for Torts
Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) outlines the principle to be applied
generally to all tort issues. 66 The section first explains that all rights and liabilities
in a tort dispute are to be governed by "the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrences and the
parties under the principles stated in [section] 6." 67 The section then highlights the
contacts to be considered when applying the principles of section 6:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.68
The contacts vary in importance depending on the particular issue before the
69court. It is of particular importance to note that section 145 instructs the court to
apply the principles of section 6 twice in the text and further explains in comment
(b) that "[t]he principles stated in section 6 underlie all rules of choice of law and
are used in evaluating the significance of relationship" between the dispute and the
interested states.70
3. The Territorial Presumptions
The traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti was integrated into the Restatement
(Second) sections for particular torts, such as personal injuries or invasion of
privacy, which can be characterized as territorial presumptions. 71 The territorial
presumptions focus on geographical contacts to determine which state's law
presumptively will be applied.72 These sections, however, differ from the
65. See Currie, supra note 40, at 178. Currie felt that courts should not weigh the
interests of competing laws and choose between them accordingly in the case of a true
conflict. Id. at 176. He believed that this was a political function not within the scope of a
court's duties in a democracy. Id. Currie felt that when a true conflict did arise, the court had
no choice but to apply forum law. Id. at 177-78.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. a (1971).
67. Id. § 145(1).
68. Id. § 145(2).
69. Id. § 145.
70. Id. § 145 cmt. b.
71. See id. §§ 146-47, 175.
72. See id. For example, section 146 states that
[i]n an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties,
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Restatement (First)'s blind application of the law of the place of injury in that they
are only presumptive rules.73 The presumptive law will only be applied after the
court has further analyzed the conflict under the most significant relationship tests
of section 6 and section 145.74 For example, section 146 states that "[i]n an action
for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in [section] 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event, the
local law of the other state will be applied.,
75
A. How the Sections Should be Applied Together
Although the three key sections may have different underlying theoretical
foundations, these sections were nonetheless intended to be applied together when
making choice-of-law decisions in tort disputes. The first step in the process is to
determine whether there is a forum choice-of-law statute that governs the issue in
dispute. If such a statute exists, the court has no choice but to follow that statute's
choice-of-law direction.7 6 If there is no governing statute, the court must look to
see if the dispute falls under one of the sections for particular torts with territorial
presumption. If the dispute is not covered by a specific section, the analysis will
be guided by the residual section for torts, section 145.78 Regardless of whether a
state's law is presumed to apply or whether section 145 must be used, the
Restatement (Second) mandates that the principles of section 6 be used to
determine which state has the most significant relationship to the parties and
occurrences. 79 The presumptive law will not be applied if it does not have the most
significant relationship to the dispute.
Again, the tie that binds all of the sections together to form the most significant
relationship test is section 6.80 The Restatement (Second) does not allow courts to
apply the law of the place of the injury without first analyzing the interest of the
various states connected to the dispute; nor does the Restatement (Second) allow
section 145 to be used as a simple grouping-of-contacts approach devoid of policy
unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied.
Id. at § 146.
73. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 209.
74. Id.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 146 (1971) (emphasis added).
Another example is section 149 which states that
[i]n an action for defamation, the local law of the state where the
publication occurs determines the rights and liabilities of the parties,
except as stated in § 150, unless, with respect to the particular issue,
some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.
Id. at § 149.
76. Id. § 6(1); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 212.
77. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 212.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 207.
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analysis.81 The other sections should be viewed as guides to help in the application
of the principles in section 6. It is likely that one of the specific sections such as
section 146 will govern a tort dispute. After the court has performed an interest
analysis, if only one state is deemed interested, the court should apply that state's
law.s 2 If more than one state is interested, but one can clearly be said to have a
more significant relationship to the dispute than the others, its law should be
applied. 3 If no state can be said to be more interested than the other vying for
application of its law, the court should fall back on the territorial presumption and
apply the law of the place of the injury.84 If the factors laid out in section 6 are not
taken into account when analyzing which state has the most significant relationship
to the dispute, the "formula would indeed suffer from circularity, . . . since the
'significance' of the relationship is the very question which the conflicts rule has to
answer."
8 5
81. Id. at 212.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. DE BOER, supra note 21, at 202 (quoting ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 351 (1962) (quotations omitted)). For examples of courts using section 6
in their choice-of-law analysis, see Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, 705 P.2d
446, 453 n.9 (Alaska 1985) (citing § 6 in footnote with limited discussion of rule); Bryant v.
Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190, 1191-97 (Ariz. 1985) ("Our analysis starts with the four contacts
specified in § 145(2), which will be taken into account in applying the principles enunciated
in § 6 .... "); Scheer v. Scheer, 881 P.2d 479, 480-82 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) ("The relative
interests of the states in the determination of the outcome and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the relevant tort rules of the interested states are the factors of greatest
importance in multistate tort cases." (quotations omitted)); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519
A.2d 13, 22-26 (Conn. 1986) ("Applying the choice of law analysis of §§ 145 and 6 to the
facts of this case involves a weighing of the relative significance of the various factors that §
6 lists."); Turner v. Lipschultz, 619 A.2d 912, 914-16 (Del. 1992) ("Pursuant to Section 145
of the Restatement of Conflicts, the local law of the state which 'has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in [Section 6]' will
govern the rights of litigants in a tort suit." (alteration in original)); State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1981); Grover v. Isom, 53
P.3d 821, 823-25 (Idaho 2002) ("Once these factors are considered, they are evaluated in
light of [section 6's] policy concerns .... ); Nelson v. Hix, 522 N:E.2d 1214, 1217-18 (Ill.
1988) ("Section 145 directs courts to consider the applicable contacts in light of the relevant
general principles embodied in section 6 governing all choice-of-law decisions."); Veasley v.
CRST International, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 896, 897-99 (Iowa 1996) ("[T]he situation-specific
sections of the Restatement, such as section 145, incorporate the provisions set forth in
section 6 thereof' and "[t]he theory behind this approach is that rather than focusing on a
single factor, the court of the forum should apply the policy of the state with the most
interest in the litigants and the outcome of the litigation." (quotations omitted)); Flaherty v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 822 A.2d 1159, 1165-68 (Me. 2003) ("Furthermore, section 145 of
the RESTATEMENT provides that in determining which state has the most significant
contacts and relationship, the principles in section 6 of the RESTATEMENT should be
considered." (emphases in original)); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 516 (Miss. 1968)
(adopting the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws); D.LC. v. Walsh, 908 S.W.2d 791,
794-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("Although this court will apply both § 6 and § 145, [t]he basic
principles governing choice of laws are those enumerated in § 6. Section 145 simply
provides that certain contacts may be taken into account in determining the choice of law
under the principles of § 6." (alteration and emphasis in original) (quotation omitted));
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II. THE LEGACY OF HUBBARD
Traditionally, Indiana followed the doctrine of lex loci delicti in tort actions.8 6
Like the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws,s7 the law of the place of the
tortious conduct governed the substantive rights and liabilities of the parties
involved in the dispute.88 The courts did not consider the relevant policies behind
the laws, the other various geographical contacts, the domiciles and residences of
the parties, or the relationships between the parties. Only one exception to the
traditional rule had previously been laid out in Indiana-namely, that the law of the
forum would be applied when the law of the situs was against the "good morals or
natural justice or prejudicial to the general interests of the citizens" of Indiana.8 9
While the insight of Babcock v. Jackson's "most significant relationship" test had
been widely known for quite some time,90 not until 1987 did Indiana realize the
need to move away from lex loci delicti as its choice-of-law doctrine in tort
disputes.91
A. Hubbard v. Greeson
The question of whether Indiana needed to move away from lex loci delicti
was finally answered in the affirmative by Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v.
Greeson.92 In Hubbard, the plaintiff, Elizabeth Greeson, filed a wrongful death
action against Hubbard Manufacturing Co., Inc. ("Hubbard").93 The plaintiff's
deceased husband, Donald Greeson, an Indiana resident, was a street light
repairman employed by Asplundh Tree Expert Company ("Asplundh"), a
Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 995 P.2d 1002, 1008-15 (Mont. 2000) ("Any conflict of
law analysis under the Restatement must begin with § 6."); Malena v. Marriott
International, Inc., 651 N.W.2d 850, 856-58 (Neb. 2002) ('These contacts must be balanced
in accordance with their significance to the general principles under § 6 .... "); Morgan v.
Biro Manufacturing Co., 474 N.E.2d 286, 288-89 (Ohio 1984) (adopting the Restatement
(Second)); Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 63, 67-68 (S.D. 1992) (adopting
the Restatement (Second)); Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting
the Restatement (Second)); Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848-50 (Tex. 2000)
("In a choice of law analysis, the number of contacts with a state is not determinative....
Rather, we must evaluate the contacts in light of the state policies underlying the particular
substantive issue."); Martineau v. Guertin, 751 A.2d 776, 778-81 (Vt. 2000); Williams v.
State, 885 P.2d 845, 849 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) ("[We examine which state has the most
significant interest in applying its law on a particular issue in light of the principles stated in
Restatement of Conflicts § 6.").
86. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 487 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), vacated
by 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
87. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) ('The law of the place of
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.").
88. Hubbard, 487 N.E.2d at 826-27.
89. Id. at 827 (quoting Wabash R.R. Co. v. Hassett, 83 N.E. 705, 709 (Ind. 1908)).
90. See Maroon v. State, 411 N.E.2d 404, 417-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (Ratliff, J.,
concurring) (expressing the need to adopt the most significant relationship test discussed in
Babcock and the Restatement (Second)); Caavers et al., supra note 3 (analyzing the benefits
of the Babcock approach).
91. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
92. Id. at 1072.
93. Hubbard, 487 N.E.2d at 826.
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Pennsylvania firm.94 Hubbard produced lift units for Asplundh specifically to be
used in cleaning, maintaining, and replacing street lights.9 Hubbard was an Indiana
corporation and produced the lift units in Indiana.96 On October 29, 1979, Donald
Greeson died in the process of using one of the defendant's lifts to repair a street
light in Illinois.97 The lift unit that Greeson was using when he died was produced
in Indiana, but was licensed and stored in Illinois at the time of the accident.
98
The plaintiffs suit claimed that her husband's death was the result of
Hubbard's negligence and "the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of
[the] lift." 99 She argued that Illinois's product liability law governed the case.' °° In
response, Hubbard filed a motion for the determination of the applicable law.'
0
'
Indiana law precluded recovery on a product liability claim if it was found that the
product represented an open and obvious danger. 0 2 Further, any finding of misuse
would also bar recovery. 1° 3 Illinois law, however, would allow liability even if the
product's danger was open and obvious and any misuse would merely reduce the
amount of recovery. 1°4 The differences would clearly affect Greeson's ability to
recover.
The trial court determined that Indiana followed the lex loci delicti approach
for tort disputes and held that Illinois law governed the rights and liabilities of the
parties. 10 5 Hubbard filed an interlocutory appeal and the Indiana Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision. 1' 6 In a footnote of the court's opinion, Judge
Ratliff expressed his view "that the better rule in these cases is the so-called
'modem rule' or 'most significant relationship approach' discussed in Babcock v.
Jackson... and later adopted by the American Law Institute [in the] Restatement
(Second)."' 10 7
The Indiana Supreme Court, perhaps listening to Judge Ratliff's suggestion
that Indiana adopt the most significant relationship test for torts, accepted the case
for review. The supreme court observed in Hubbard that "[r]igid application of the
traditional rule to this case ... would lead to an anomalous result. ' °8 All the states
bordering Indiana had moved away from strict applications of the lex loci delicti
doctrine and would have applied the substantive law of Indiana. 10 9 In fact, the only
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ind. 1987).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1073.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 487 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), vacated
by 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
106. Id. at 826-27.
107. Id. at 827 n.l (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)).
108. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073.
109. Id. (citing Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1970) (holding that the "most
significant contacts" rule best serves the interest of Illinois and the parties in multi-state tort
actions); Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1982) (applying
Michigan law when two residents are involved in an accident even if the injury occurred in
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jurisdiction that would not have applied Indiana law to the dispute was Indiana.ll 0
Indiana had already moved away from its traditional rule in contract cases that the
law of the place where the breach occurred would govern and had adopted a rule
allowing the state with the most significant contact to the dispute to apply its
law.11 The court understood that it was time to look elsewhere to avoid
inappropriate results in the tort context as well.
The court, however, was not in a rush to abandon the traditional rule of lex loci
delicti in its entirety. The court felt that in many cases "the place of the tort will be
significant and the place with the most contacts." '" 2 In those cases, the court
thought that "the traditional rule serves well.""' 3 The court did recognize that in
cases "where the place of the tort bears little connection to the legal action" a court
should be permitted to consider and evaluate other factors. Those factors
included: "1) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 2) the
residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place where the relationship
is centered." 15 The court cited section 145(2) of the Restatement (Second) for these
factors and indicated that they "should be evaluated according to their relative
importance to the particular issues being litigated."'"16
The first step in the Hubbard court's new choice-of-law approach was to
determine "whether the place of the tort 'bears little connection.' to the dispute.' 
17
Even though the injury took place in Illinois while the decedent was at work there,
the coroner's inquest took place in Illinois, and the decedent's family received
workers compensation from the State of Illinois, the court held that "[nione of these
facts relate[d] to the wrongful death action."'" 8 Therefore, the place of the tort was
insignificant. " 9
The second step in the court's analysis was to apply the additional factors.'
20
Both of the plaintiffs theories of recovery concerned the manufacturing of the lift
unit in Indiana.' 21 The Greesons were Indiana residents and Hubbard was an
Indiana corporation. 22 The decedent had taken the lift unit to Hubbard's Indiana
plant for repairs and maintenance and, therefore, the relationship between the
parties was centered in Indiana.' 23 The court found that Indiana had "the more
significant relationship and contacts" and applied Indiana law.'
24
another state)); Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 267 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 1971) (stating
that in Ohio lex loci delicti will not be automatically applied); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d
259 (Ky. 1967) (applying Kentucky law despite occurrence of accident in Indiana)).
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. 1945)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1073-74.
116. Id. at 1074.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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1. No Mention of Section 6
For the Hubbard court's new choice-of-law approach in tort cases it cites the
contacts listed in Restatement (Second) section 145(2): the place of the alleged
tortious conduct, the domicile of the parties, and the place where the relationship
between them is centered.125 Although section 145 does require courts to consider
these contacts, 126 the Hubbard court's attempted application of section 145 does
not follow the drafters' intent. The most obvious divergence from the Restatement
(Second) is the absence of any mention of, let alone any application of section 6's
choice-of-law principles. Section 145(2) explicitly states that these contacts are
only "to be taken into account in applying the principles of [section] 6."' 127 Also
absent is citation to section 145(1), which requires courts to apply the law of the
state which "has the most significant relationship" to the dispute. 28 Although the
Hubbard opinion refers to Indiana as having the "more significant relationship" to
the dispute, 29 this is not the same test articulated in the Restatement (Second).
The Restatement (Second) drafters clearly emphasized that the "principles
stated in section 6 underlie all rules of choice of law and are used in evaluating the
significance of a relationship, with respect to the particular issue, to the potentially
interested states, the occurrence and the parties."1 0 Professor Reese, the American
Law Institute's Reporter for the Restatement (Second) wrote:
The choice of law provisions of the Restatement Second revolve
around a central theme or theory. This theory is that the values stated in
section 6 underlie the entire field of choice of law and that all of the
black letter rules stem from these values. The clear inference is that
further develo ment of choice of law rules should be made in light of
these values.
Thus, any purported application of the Restatement (Second) without reference to
the principles of section 6 cannot be characterized as a proper application. A court,
when applying section 145, should keep in mind that:
The purpose sought to be achieved by the relevant tort rules of the
interested states, and the relation of these states to the occurrence and
the parties, are important factors to be considered in determining the
state of most significant relationship. This is because the interest of a
state in having its tort rule applied in the determination of a particular
issue will depend upon the purpose sought to be achieved by that rule
and by the relation of the state to the occurrence and the parties.
132
125. Id.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ind. 1987).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. b (1971).
131. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34
MERCER L. REv. 501, 516 (1983).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OFLAWS § 145 cmt. c (1971).
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Nowhere in the Hubbard opinion is there a consideration of the relative
policies of either Indiana or Illinois law.' 33 Nor is there a direction by the court for
the lower courts to consider factors like the relevant policies of the forum and other
interested states, the needs of interstate and international systems, or the ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied. 134 Without taking into
account these considerations or conducting any form of interest analysis, Indiana
cannot characterize itself as a Restatement (Second) jurisdiction or claim to be
applying the most significant relationship test inspired by Babcock v. Jackson.
2. Which "Most Significant Relationship" Test is This?
The choice-of-law rule handed down in Hubbard v. Greeson is not the most
significant contact test found in the Restatement (Second); rather, it is an approach
that was plainly rejected by the American Law Institute. As noted above, the
principles of section 6-the heart of the Restatement (Second)-are not part of
Indiana's choice-of-law analysis. Although the Indiana Supreme Court did not
explicitly direct lower courts not to consider the relevant policies underlying the
laws of the interested states, it is clear that the courts are not required to include
any sort of governmental interest analysis as part of their choice-of-law
decisionmaking process. 135 Professor Symeonides concurs in this assessment,
stating that Indiana's "significant-contacts approach differs from section 6 of the
Restatement (Second) in that it calls for a consideration of the factual contacts
alone, rather than of a set of policies in light of the factual contacts as does the
Restatement (Second)."'136
The Hubbard approach might be best characterized as an approach starting
with a tremendously strong territorial presumption that falls back on a grouping of
contacts approach when the place of the tort is first deemed insignificant. The
Hubbard test's presumption that the law of the situs will control the dispute is
considerably stronger than the various presumptions found in the Restatement
(Second). While the Restatement (Second)'s presumptions can be displaced by a
showing that "some other state has a more significant relationship" to the
dispute, 137 the Hubbard approach does not go that far. Hubbard only requires that
the situs's connection to the legal dispute not be insignificant.' 38 The court was
confident that in most cases the place of the tort would not be insignificant. 39 Once
a court has found that the place of the tort bears more than a little connection to the
case, the analysis ends and that state's law will be applied. 4° Unlike the
Restatement (Second), which always considers the relationship of all interested
states to the dispute, 141 so long as the connection of the place of the tort to the
133. See Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d 1071.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Symeonides, supra note 7, at 1272 n.159.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-47, (1971).
138. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
139. See id. at 1073.
140. See id. at 1074.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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dispute is found to be significant, Indiana courts are not to consider whether
another state has a more significant relationship to the dispute.
42
In the rare instance that a court finds that the situs of the dispute bears little
connection to the legal dispute, Hubbard requires a grouping-of-contacts or center-
of-gravity analysis. 43 The contacts to be considered in this analysis are those
outlined in section 145 of the Restatement (Second). 44 Although courts are to
evaluate these factors or contacts according to the relative importance to the case,
Indiana courts are basically required to add up the contacts of each state and weigh
the aggregate of each interested state's contacts against those of others. 145 This
weighing of contacts is the result of the Hubbard court's refusal to allow policy
analysis into the equation and the denial of the importance of the purposive nature
of law.
C. The Promise of Gollnick
Two years after the Indiana Supreme Court decided Hubbard Manufacturing
Co. v. Greeson, the questions regarding Indiana's choice-of-law doctrine were
augmented by Gollnick v. Gollnick. 46 This personal injury case was originally
decided before the Indiana Supreme Court broke away from the strict application of
lex loci delicti in Hubbard.147 Gregory and Verna Gollnick, both California
residents, were married in 1967.148 After their divorce, Verna was awarded physical
custody of their daughters, subject only to Gregory's reasonable visitation nnhts. 4 9
In 1983, Gregory took his daughters to Indiana to visit their aunt and uncle. On a
morning during their visit, Gregory gave his daughter, Karen, permission to sled
down her aunt and uncle's driveway.' 5' The night before, the children had sled
down the driveway under adult supervision and the children had been warned to be
aware of cars entering the cul-de-sac. The view of oncoming motorists was
obscured at the end of the driveway by embankments. 152 This time, however, there
was no adult supervision; Karen was struck by a car and suffered extensive
injuries.153
The question before the court was whether Gregory, a California resident,
would be protected by Indiana's parental immunity doctrine.IM At the time the
court decided the case, Indiana still followed the rule of lex loci delicti.155 The
injury occurred in Indiana, so Indiana substantive law applied. 156 Gregory,
142. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073.
143. Id. at 1073-74.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. 517 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), afftd, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989).
147. Gollnick v. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), vacated by 517 N.E.2d
1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
148. Id. at 647.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 648.
156. Id.
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however, was not protected by Indiana's parental immunity doctrine because non-
custodial parents were not covered under the rule.'
5 7
The court of appeals accepted Gregory's petition for rehearing after Hubbard
was decided to determine whether a different result would be reached under the
newly adopted "most significant relationship" approach. 58 After the court
discussed the Hubbard test, it went on to discuss several tort cases involving
conflicts between interested states' family laws regarding capacity to sue.' 59 The
court's discussion of these cases bordered on what was described above as
governmental interest analysis, constantly concerning itself with California's
interest in governing its family relationships.16 None of the cases discussed were
concerned with which state had the most contacts with the dispute, but all
addressed which state's policy concerns would be most affected.' 6' The court went
further outside the Hubbard approach by citing the Restatement (Second) section
169(2) which, regarding intra-family immunity, directed courts to apply the law of
the state of the parties' domiciles. 62 The result of the court's analysis was a finding
that California had an overriding interest in the parent-child relationship and
California law was to be applied. 63 Unfortunately for Gregory, California had
abolished parent-child immunity and Karen could still maintain her negligence
action against him. 64
1. The Indiana Supreme Court's Review of Gollnick
When the case finally made its way to the Supreme Court of Indiana, the
court's opinion did not offer an extensive review of the court of appeals'
157. Id. at 647.
158. Gollnick v. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Id. at 1258-59.
160. See id. The Gollnick court first discussed Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal.
1955), in which a mother and her unemancipated children brought a suit against their father
(all parties were California residents) for injuries resulting from an automobile accident that
occurred in Idaho. The court applied California parental immunity law because to hold
otherwise "would subject the rights and duties attendant to the family relationship to
constant change as family members crossed state lines during temporary absences from
home." Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d at 1258 (discussing Emery, 289 P.2d 218). Second, the
Gollnick court discussed Wartell v. Formusa, 213 N.E.2d 544, 545-46 (Ill. 1966) in which a
wife sued the executor of her husband's estate after both were injured in an automobile
accident while vacationing in Florida. The court held that because the couple was from
Illinois, "Illinois has the predominant interest in the preservation of the husband-wife
relationship of its citizens, and to apply the laws of Florida to the question of whether
interspousal tort suits may be permitted between Illinois residents would be illogical and
without a sound basis." Third, the Gollnick court discussed Aurora National Bank v.
Anderson, 268 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971), in which a bank, as guardian, sued on behalf
of a minor child who was injured in a car accident while riding with his mother in Iowa. All
the parties involved were Illinois residents, including the driver of the other car. Gollnick,
517 N.E.2d at 1259. The court felt the question of the child's capacity to sue her mother was
a question of family law. Id. Illinois had the predominant interest in the parent-child
relationship and its law was applied. Id.
161. See Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d at 1258-59.
162. Id. at 1259.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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decision.' 65 The supreme court found that the court of appeals had "applied
California law to the claim against Gregory E. Gollnick in accordance with the
choice of law rule announced in Hubbard." 66 The court said little else about the
court of appeals's application of Hubbard approach, except to reiterate that the
lower court's "decision was correct." 167 The Indiana Supreme Court did not explain
whether the court of appeals's apparent use of interest analysis was permissible
under the Hubbard approach, nor did it answer the question of whether lower
courts were permitted to look to other sections of the Restatement (Second) besides
section 145 in their choice-of-law analysis.' 68 The court's brief opinion arguably
suggested that the Hubbard case had opened Indiana's door to the Restatement
(Second) and that Gollnick was part of a gradual adoption of the Restatement
(Second)'s entire philosophy on choice-of-law decisionmaking, including the
consideration of the principles outlined in section 6.
2. Gollnick Viewed As an Exception to Hubbard
Although it was possible that Gollnick had opened the door completely in
Indiana to the choice-of-law principles of the Restatement (Second), subsequent
judicial history has not been fully supportive of it. It seems more likely that that
Indiana courts view Gollnick as an exception to the Hubbard rule for choice-of-law
disputes involving intra-family disputes. 69 Most decisions after Gollnick do not
cite Golnick and continue to cite Hubbard as the controlling decision in Indiana
choice-of-law disputes.
1 70
The reasons for departing from a strict application of Hubbard in intra-family
disputes are significant. The state of domicile will likely have a predominate
interest in governing and preserving its residents' familial relationships and the
laws governing familial rights and liabilities should not vary as members move
about the country temporarily.' 7 ' These reasons, of course, are based in policy and
the desire to realize the purposive nature of the various states' familial laws. It is
not clear why the Indiana Supreme Court has chosen to allow for the consideration
165. Gollnick v. Gollnick, 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989) (per curiam).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See Peter T. Snow, Indiana Choice-of-Law Doctrine After Gollnick v. Gollnick, 76
IND. L.J. 961, 973 (2001).
170. Id. at 971. Mr. Snow compiled a long list of Indiana Court of Appeals decisions
demonstrating that Gollnick has been ignored. See id. at 971 n. 100 (citing Cox ex rel. Zick v.
Nichols, 690 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Hubbard Manufacturing. Co. v.
Greeson, 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987) and In re Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994)); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Asher, 689 N.E.2d 1283, 1286-88 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (citing Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d 1071, Castelli v. Steele, 700 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. Ind.
1988), and Travelers Insurance Cos. v. Rogers, 579 N.E.2d 1328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)); In re
Estate of Bruck, 632 N.E.2d at 747-49 (citing Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d 1071, and Thomas v.
Whiteford National Lease, 580 N.E.2d 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)); Thomas, 580 N.E.2d at
717-18 (citing Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d 1071, and Tompkins v. Isbell, 543 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989)); Tompkins, 543 N.E.2d 680, 680-82 (citing Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d 1071, and
Bencor Corp. v. Harris, 534 N.E.2d 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989))).
171. See Gollnick v. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1258-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also
Snow, supra note 169, at 974.
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of the various policy interests of interested states in the context of family law, but
not in other areas of law. All areas of law, including family law, are propelled in
some sense by transcendent social goals that lawmakers intend to achieve. It is
possible that the Indiana Supreme Court, although not ready to accept the entire
Restatement (Second), is willing to tolerate those lower courts concerned with the
various policies of the interested states to consider those policies when making
choice-of-law decisions.
C. The Lower Indiana Courts and the Federal Diversity Courts Take on Hubbard
Although Golinick presented the opportunity for confusion among lower
Indiana courts and those federal courts sitting in diversity in Indiana regarding how
to properly apply the choice-of-law approach enunciated in Hubbard, there has
been very little deviation from the approach laid out in Hubbard. Most courts have
followed a straightforward application of Hubbard, some have actually been more
conservative than Hubbard, and a rare few allow interest analysis to creep into the
thought process.
1. Straightforward Application of the Hubbard Test
As noted above, the majority of courts attempting to apply the Hubbard
approach have had little problem applying the simple test. 7 2 For example, in
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Allied Corp., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the traditional lex loci delicti rule should be applied following the first
step in Hubbard.173 While the defendant Allied Corporation's tanker car filled with
anhydrous hydrogen fluoride was in route from its chemical plant in Canada to
Elkhart, Indiana, the tanker stopped in Metropolis, Illinois where the chemicals
were unloaded and the car was labeled empty by the defendant. 174 Sometime before
the car reached Elkhart, the plaintiff, Consolidated Railroad, took control of the car
and transported it to Elkhart to be stored in Consolidated's rail yard. 75 The toxic
chemicals in the car had not been properly unloaded and began to leak, causing the
evacuation of nearly 1500 Elkhart residents. 76 Consolidated sued Allied on a
theory of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity to recover $125,000
which Consolidated had voluntarily paid to the local residents to cover medical
treatment, economic losses, and property damage resulting from the chemical
leak. 17 7 The theory of liability tied the cause of action to Indiana because the escape
172. See Judge v. Pilot Oil Corp., 205 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the place
of injury to be significant and applying lex loci delicti); Jean v. Dugan, 20 F.3d 255, 261 (7th
Cir. 1994) (finding the place of injury to be the most important contact when applying
Hubbard's additional factors); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Allied Corp., 882 F.2d 254, 258 (7th
Cir. 1989) (finding the place of injury to be significant and applying lex loci delicti); Bencor
Corp. v. Harris, 534 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (finding place of injury to be
significant and applying lex loci delicti).
173. Consol. Rail Corp., 882 F.2d at 256.
174. Id. at 255.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 255-57.
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of the toxins took place in Indiana; therefore, Indiana had a significant contact with
the litigation and Indiana substantive law was applied.178
2. Conservative Application of the Hubbard Test
The First District Court of Appeals of Indiana appears to have had even more
trouble abandoning lex loci delicti than did the Hubbard court. In Tompkins v.
Isbell, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover damages suffered during an automobile
crash in which the defendant's tractor collided with the plaintiffs automobile close
to the Indiana border at Robinson, Illinois. 179 The plaintiff, an Indiana resident, was
returning from his business in Illinois.180 At the time of the accident, the defendant,
also an Indiana resident, was driving a tractor for an Indiana corporation and was
also in route to Indiana.18 1 Illinois followed the pure comparative negligence rule
which reduced the plaintiff's recovery according to the fault attributed to him.'
8 2
Indiana, however, still followed the more traditional contributory negligence rule
which barred all recovery if the plaintiff was partly responsible for his injury.'8 3
In reviewing the trial court's application of the Hubbard test, the court of
appeals was particularly moved by the fact that the last event necessary to make the
defendant liable, the injury, occurred in Illinois. 184 The court stated that the parties'
operation of their vehicles would be the focus of the case and Illinois' rules of the
road would govern their conduct. 8 5 The court then concluded the place of the tort,
Illinois, had "extensive connection" to the case; therefore, the trial court was
correct to apply lex loci delicti.'86 The court of appeals did not delineate what was
Illinois' "extensive connection" to the case. Besides being the situs, the only other
connection Illinois had to the dispute was the fact that the plaintiff worked in
Illinois.18 7 How this gave Illinois a significant relationship to the case is unclear.
What is clear from this case is how strong the presumption is, under Hubbard, that
the law of the place of the injury is to be applied.
The court's finding that Illinois did have a significant relationship to the case
forced the court to stop its analysis under Hubbard immediately. Without being
able to move past the first prong of the Hubbard test, it was unable to consider the
facts that clearly showed that Indiana had a more significant interest in the
resolution of the case. Even under the second prong of the Hubbard analysis,
Indiana substantive law would have been applied because all the parties were
Indiana residents in route to Indiana. More importantly, if the principles of section
6 of the Restatement (Second) had been applied, Indiana's interest in governing the
rights and liabilities of fellow Indiana residents would outweigh Illinois' regulatory
178. Id. at 258.
179. 543 N.E.2d 680, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 682 n.1. Interestingly, after the accident, "the Illinois legislature altered this
'pure' comparative negligence rule and adopted a contributory fault system similar to that
presently in force in Indiana." Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 682.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 681.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
interest. Why the court was quick to apply lex loci delicti is not apparent. Perhaps
underlying the court's decision was a substantive preference to avoid placing
possible limits on the plaintiffs ability to recover against the defendant that could
arise if Indiana's anti-recovery contributory negligence rule had been applied.
3. Interest Analysis Creeping Into Applications of the Hubbard Test
Although they did not cite Gollnick. two courts appear to have allowed some
interest analysis into their application of the Hubbard test. In Castelli v. Steele, an
Illinois patient brought a medical malpractice action against her Indiana doctor and
hospital for misdiagnosis, improper treatment of her kidney condition, and failure
to inform her that she may lose her kidney. 88 Indiana law required a claimant to
first present her complaint to a medical review panel but Illinois law allowed
patients to go directly to court. 89 The defense moved for dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Indiana law because the complaint had not first
gone before such a panel. 19° Although the defendant doctor's negligent conduct
clearly occurred in Indiana, the subsequent injury to the plaintiffs kidney occurred
in Illinois. 19' The court was not convinced that, under Hubbard, Illinois bore more
than a "little connection" to the dispute, even though the plaintiff resided there,
some phone communication originated there, and the injury occurred there.' 92
When applying the additional Hubbard factors, the court felt that the negligence
occurring in Indiana was "the most important factor because Indiana doctors are
strictly regulated by the state of Indiana and must conform their practices to the
laws of [Indiana]."'193 Although the court did not delve very far into the policy
behind the specific section of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act that required the
initial review of a complaint by a medical panel, the court was clearly considering
more than just geographical contacts. The court was considering what general state
policies were implicated by those contacts.
The Fourth District Court of Appeals of Indiana has also inserted a brief
amount of interest analysis into the Hubbard test in KPMG Peat Marwick v.
Asher.194 In KPMG Peat Marwick, Merchants Grain, Inc. ("MGI"), an operator of
grain elevators, had the defendant, KPMG Peat Marwick ("KPMG") of Missouri
audit and report on MGI's financial conditions. 195 MGI then sent the report to the
USDA to renew its grain elevator operating license under the U.S. Warehouse
Act. 196 Later, the plaintiffs, Indiana farmers, deposited grain with MGI on a credit
sale basis. 19 7 MGI soon went bankrupt and was unable to pay the plaintiffs.'98 The
188. 700 F. Supp. 449, 450-51 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
189. Id. at 451.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 453-54.
192. Id. at 454. The court did note that "[a]lthough the Hubbard decision is well-
reasoned, it does not provide a definitive standard for determining whether a state in which
the injury occurred bears 'little connection' to the cause of action so as to reach the third
level of inquiry." Id. at 454 n.5.
193. Id. at 454-55.
194. 689 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id. at 1284.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1284-85.
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plaintiffs' complaint alleged that only because of KPMG's negligent audit of MGI
was MGI able to renew its license and take the plaintiff's grain.' 99 Finding the
place of the tort to bear little connection to the dispute, the court went on to apply
the additional Hubbard factors.2 °° Citing Castelli, the court found the paramount
factor to be that the negligent acts occurred in Missouri. 20 1 The court stated that
"Missouri has a substantial interest in applying its law on a professional negligence
case to accountants conducting 'their professional activity' in Missouri. 20' Again,
like the court in Castelli, the KMPG court did not conduct a comprehensive
governmental interest analysis to ascertain the purposes that might be realized
behind each state's competing law. However, the court did at least consider
Missouri's interest in regulating its resident accountants as opposed to simply
looking at which state had the most contacts with the dispute.
D. Allen, Still Unclear
In 2002, the Indiana Supreme Court had a second opportunity to clarify the
Hubbard test in Allen v. Great American Reserve Insurance Co. 20' The plaintiffs,
insurance agents from North and South Carolina, were recruited by the defendant,
Glen H. Guffey of Jefferson National Life, to sell the Flex II, a tax-deferred
annuity, to individual residents of the Carolinas. 2°4 Jefferson National Life later
merged into defendant Great American Reserve Insurance Company ("GARCO")
which succeeded to the policies. 205 Guffey was a South Carolina resident and
GARCO was a Texas insurance company with its principle place of business in
Indiana. 20 6 The individual plaintiffs' contracts with GARCO all contained both a
choice-of-law provision providing that Indiana choice-of-law would control and a
forum selection clause providing that any action between the parties must be
brought in Hamilton County, Indiana. 0 7 Guffey was responsible for training the
plaintiffs; and in so doing, Guffey instructed the plaintiffs that "[i]n exchange for
annual premiums, the Flex II promised annuity income in the future" but had no
front-end load.20 8 In other words, no fees or commission would reduce the value of
the policy.20 9 Unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, the Flex II did have a front-end load in
the first five years and the entire premium did not go to enhance the value of the
annuity until the sixth year. 21 Upon discovery by the South Carolina Department
of Insurance, the plaintiffs signed consent decrees and admitted to having
misrepresented the annuity to their clients. 211 The plaintiffs brought suit against
both Guffey and GARCO on various counts of fraud, unfair trade practices, civil
199. Id. at 1285.
200. Id. at 1287.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quotation omitted).
203. 766 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. 2002).
204. Id. at 1160.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1160-61.
210. Id. at 1161.
211. Id.
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conspiracy, negligence, and indemnification.2 2 No party attempted to argue that
North Carolina law should govern any of the claims; thus, the Indiana Supreme
Court only had to consider whether South Carolina or Indiana law should be
controlling.213
As to the plaintiffs' common law fraud claim based in tort, the court applied
the Hubbard test. 214 The court observed that the "last event necessary to establish
the elements of misrepresentation of a material fact reasonably relied upon," which
were "reliance and consequent damages," occurred in South Carolina."' Not fully
explaining why, the court announced that "South Carolina has a sufficient
relationship to this action to satisfy traditional lex loci delicti under Hubbard.'216
Not stopping there, however, the court went on to say that "[e]ven if this were not
the case, as in Hubbard, and some of the factors enunciated in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws are considered, or other reasonable choice of law
doctrines are applied, the result is the same."217 In a footnote, the court explained:
Under a "state interests" analysis, South Carolina clearly has the
strongest interest in maintaining the integrity of its insurance markets.
To the extent choice of law should be informed by the result the choice
produces, we perceive no clear effect on the result in this case, though
one may unfold as the facts develop. South Carolina also emerges
victorious under Section 148 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws, which specifically addresses claims of fraud and
misrepresentation. According to it, where, as in the present case, the
alleged misrepresentations and the reliance upon them occur in different
states, the following factors must be considered to determine which
state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the
parties: (a) the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the defendant's representations; (b) the place where the plaintiff
received the representations; (c) the place where the defendant made the
representations; (d) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; (e) the place where a
tangible thing which is the subject of the transaction between the parties
was situated at the time; and (f) the place where the plaintiff is to render
performance under a contract which he has been induced to enter by the
false representations of the defendant. Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 148 (1971). With regard to GARCO, contacts (a), (b), and (f)
clearly point to South Carolina, and only contact (c) points
unequivocally to Indiana. Contact (d) is evenly divided between the
two, and contact (e) is largely irrelevant to this action. As comment j to
section 148 points out, when contacts (a), (b), and (f) are all in the same
state, that state will "usually be the state of the applicable law." Id. at
cmt. j. With regard to Guffey, all the section 148 factors support the
application of South Carolina law.
218
212. Id. at 1162-70.
213. Id. at 1162.
214. Id. at 1164.
215. Id. at 1164-65 (quotations omitted).
216. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1165 n.3.
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The court also explained that South Carolina law would govern the allegations of
conspiracy, tortious interference with a business relationship, and negligence
against Guffey and GARCO for the same reasons the court had found that South
Carolina law would govern the fraud claim.219 In determining that South Carolina
law governed the negligence claim against GARCO, the court cited Restatement
(Second) section 174 for the rule that "when questions of vicarious liability arise,
'the law selected by application of the rule of [section] 145 determines whether one
person is liable for the tort of another."'
220
As to the claim against Guffey for breach of contract accompanied by a
fraudulent act, the court cited Restatement (Second) section 291; if "the agent is
employed to do a number of acts on the principal's behalf in a single state, the local
law of this state will usually determine the rights and duties owed by the principal
and agent to each other." 22 The agency relationships were substantial in South
Carolina and, therefore, South Carolina law was applied.222 The court also used this
reason to find that South Carolina law also governed the indemnification claim
against GARCO.223
The Indiana Supreme Court's discussion of the various choice-of-law issues in
Allen left much to be desired. The court continued to cite various sections of the
Restatement (Second) without explaining when lower courts may look to sections
other than section 145 when the place of the wrong is deemed insignificant. The
court cited section 291 but again ignored the Restatement (Second)'s command to
apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship under the principle
of section 6.224 The court also ignored section 6 in its discussion of section 148 and
section 174.225
The Allen opinion did, however, implicitly solve the question left by Goilnick
of whether family law was an exception to the Hubbard test or alternatively,
whether instead that some degree of interest analysis would be tolerated under the
Hubbard test. As noted above, in Allen the court continued to cite other sections of
the Restatement (Second) besides section 145 while simultaneously ignoring each
of those sections' instructions to use the principles of section 6 in their application.
Further, in the footnote discussion of "other reasonable choice of law doctrines,"
the court discusses "state interest analysis." Surely, the Indiana Supreme Court
would not systematically ignore [section] 6 each time it cites the Restatement
(Second) and refer to interest analysis as another choice-of-law doctrine if it did not
consider section 6's governmental interest analysis to be completely outside the
Hubbard approach. Further, the court made no reference to Gollnick anywhere in
219. Id. at 1168-69.
220. Id. at 1169.
221. Id. at 1163.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1169.
224. This section explains that "[tihe rights and duties of a principal and agent toward
each other are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction under the
principles stated in § 6." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 291 (1971).
225. Section 148(1) also directs courts to use the principle of § 6 to determine which
state has the most significant relationship to the case. Id. at § 148(1). Section 174 directs
courts to use § 145 to decide whether one party is liable for the tort of another and as
discussed above, § 145 directs courts to use § 6 as well. Id. at § 174.
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the Allen opinion; therefore, family law appears to be the only exception allowing
for a state's policy interest to be considered in a choice-of-law determination. What
is left after Allen is likely the same overall approach outlined in Hubbard and
discussed above.
E. Simon v. United States of America, an Opportunity for Section 6
Recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Indiana
Supreme Court about the Hubbard approach raised by Simon v. United States.
226
The case arose from an airplane crash in Somerset, Kentucky that killed the pilot
and three passengers. 227 Two of the passengers were from Pennsylvania, one was
from Ohio, and the pilot was a New Jersey resident working in Pennsylvania.
228
The plane was owned by a Pennsylvania corporation and was hangared there, as
well. 229 Severe weather necessitated an instrument flight rules landing.230 Air traffic
controllers in Indianapolis cleared the flight for a Simplified Direction Facility
("SDF") runway approach at the airport in Somerset. 2 ' SDF is a system that
facilitates a plane's blind landing. 232 However, the SDF system in Somerset had
been out of service for nearly five years, as reflected in the Federal Aviation
Administration's Airport Facility Directory.233 Unable to communicate with air
traffic controllers because of the weather conditions, the pilot relied on the
Instrument Approach Procedure ("IAP") to guide the landing. The IAP, created
by the government in Washington, D.C., lists navigable approaches to the nation's
many airports. 235 As the plane neared Somerset it was unable to use the SDF
system, causing the plane to lose its course and ultimately crash several miles from
the airport.
236
The various decedents' estates brought suit against the United States alleging
two counts of negligence: (1) that the government negligently published the IAP,
which stated that the Somerset airport's SDF system was active; and (2) that the air
traffic controllers negligently relied on the IAP, failed to monitor the plane's
landing aproach, and failed to maintain communication with the plane during its
descent.
2
The plaintiffs sought application of the Pennsylvania substantive law, while
the United States sought application of Indiana substantive law. 238 The laws
conflict in three ways. First, Pennsylvania permits joint and several liability and
right of contribution; Indiana does not.239 Second, Pennsylvania allows recovery for
226. 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003), certifying questions to 794 N.E.2d 1087 (Ind. 2003).
227. Id. at 196-97.
228. Id. at 196.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 197.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 204 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-12 (West 1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8322, 8324 (West 1998))
[Vol.79:533
2004] INDIANA'S MISAPPLICATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 561
both wrongful death and survival damages; Indiana does not. 240 Third,
Pennsylvania also allows damages for the "decedent's conscious pain and suffering
from the moment of injury to the time of death"; Indiana does not.
The district court, after concluding that both Indiana's conflict law and
substantive law applied, certified its choice-of-law analysis to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals for immediate review pursuant to the interlocutory decisions rule,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2003).242 The Third Circuit explained that the Federal Tort
Claims Act requires federal courts in a multi-state tort action "to apply the
[conflicts] law of the place where the acts of negligence occurred., 243 This raised
the question of whether to apply Indiana's conflict law, where the air traffic
controllers were negligent, or the District of Columbia's conflict law, where the
government negligently published the IAP, assuming the two rules conflict.
24 4
Upon examination, the court characterized Indiana's test as "a modified lex loci
delicti test" and the District of Columbia's test as "a hybrid of 'governmental
interest' and Restatement (Second) methodologies. 245 Further, the court found that
the District of Columbia explicitly recognizes the choice-of-law doctrine of
depecage-"the process whereby different issues in a single case arising out of a
single set of facts are decided according to the laws of different states"-while
Indiana's case law has not answered the question of depecage.246
The Third Circuit held that in Federal Tort Claims Act cases it would "apply
the choice-of-law regime of the jurisdiction in which the last significant act or
omission occurred" and that "the 'last significant act' approach clearly points to
Indiana, the location of the air traffic controllers' negligence. ' '247 This brought the
court to the question important to this Note: whether the Hubbard test would apply
Indiana or Pennsylvania substantive law? The parties agreed that the place of
injury, Kentucky, bore little connection to the dispute and moved on to the
Hubbard test's second prong.
248
When the Third Circuit applied the Hubbard test's second prong, the court
realized that "Hubbard gives no guidance as to which factor is most important or
how to 'break a tie' between two quantitatively equal states. 249 The court's
analysis highlights this problem:
The first factor, "the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred," clearly favors Indiana because no negligence occurred in
Pennsylvania. The second factor, "the residence or place of business of
the parties," seems to favor Pennsylvania. Hart Delaware, which owned
the plane, was incorporated in Pennsylvania, and plaintiff Fare [the
pilot] worked in Pennsylvania. Although plaintiff Schalliol lived in
240. Id. (citing Cahoon v. Cummings, 715 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App. 1999)).
241. Id. at 204-05.
242. Id. at 194-95.
243. Id. at 194 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2003); Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1 (1962)).
244. Id. at 200.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 201 (citing Broome v. Antlers' Hunting Club, 595 F.2d 921, 923 n.5 (3d Cir.
1979)).
247. Id. at 204.
248. Id. at 205.
249. Id.
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Indiana, three of the four Simon plaintiffs lived in Pennsylvania. While
the air traffic controllers presumably lived in Indiana, they are not the
defendants-the United States is the defendant, and it is assumed to
reside in all states or no state. On balance, the "residence or place of
business of the parties" seems to favor Pennsylvania.
The third factor, "the place where the parties' relationship is
centered," is somewhat difficult to conceptualize on these facts. At no
time were the parties located in the same state-their only relationship
involved reliance on a map and communication over a radio, neither of
which seems "centered" in a particular place.
Surveying the three Hubbard factors, the first points to Indiana, the
second to Pennsylvania, and the third is indeterminate.
250
The Third Circuit, refusing to speculate, certified the following questions to the
Indiana Supreme Court:
(1) whether a true conflict exists between Indiana's and D.C.'s choice-
of-law rules; and (2) if there is a true conflict and Indiana's choice-of-
law rules therefore control . . . .how to resolve a split among the
Hubbard factors ...and what substantive law Indiana would choose
under these facts.251
The answers to these questions will hopefully illuminate whether the Indiana
Supreme Court has rejected section 6 of the Restatement (Second) or whether the
court has in its common law tradition only adopted those sections of the
Restatement (Second) necessary to resolve the disputes previously before it.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE HUBBARD TEST
When the Indiana Supreme Court decided Hubbard v. Greeson, it took a much
needed step away from the traditional rule of lex loci delicti. And although the
court's decision to do so followed sound reasoning, there are still unresolved
problems with the Hubbard approach. The court's review of Simon v. United States
gives the court the opportunity to resolve the following issues.
A. The Lack of a Definitive Standard
Judge McKinney pointed out in Castelli v. Steele that the Hubbard opinion
"does not provide a definitive standard for determining whether a state in which the
injury occurred bears 'little connection' to the cause of action."252 Neither of the
subsequent Supreme Court opinions have clarified what degree of connection is
necessary for the situs to meet the first prong of the Hubbard test-whether the
place of the tort "bears little connection"253-and thereby avoid consideration of
another state's relationship to the dispute. Would a finding that one of the parties is
domiciled or employed in the state of the injury be adequate? It would be plausible
for a lower court to assume that this would satisfy a test looking only for more than
250. Id. (citations omitted).
251. Id.
252. 700 F. Supp. 449, 454 n.5 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
253. Hubbard Mfg. Co. v. Greeson, 515 N.E. 2d 1071, 1073-74 (Ind. 1987).
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a little connection to the dispute. This is exactly what happened in Tompkins v.
Isbell, where Illinois was found to bear more than a little connection to a car
accident occurring there, when the only other connection between Illinois and the
parties was that the plaintiff's place of business was located there. 2 ' The ambiguity
in the first step of the Hubbard analysis may result in the test being inconsistently
applied; therefore, the court should clarify this standard.
B. Hubbard is Still Holding Strong to Ideas It was Meant to Fight
When the court decided Hubbard, it was concerned that the mechanical
application of the traditional lex loci delicti rule for torts would in some cases lead
to anomalous results. Despite this sound observation, the court continues to hold
tenaciously to a slightly loosened version of the old rule. The idea that applying the
lex loci delicti rule when the court finds that the place of injury bears more than just
a "little connection" to the dispute does not always insure that the law of the state
with the most significant relationship to the dispute is applied. There is always a
possibility that several states will bear more than a little connection to a dispute.
Just having more than a little connection to a dispute does not mean that a state has
the most significant relationship to that dispute. The first prong of the test can be
satisfied all too easily and without thorough consideration of other factors and
policies, as evidence by Tompkins.
There is little practical difference between a test that looks at whether a state
has more than just a little connection to a dispute (Hubbard) and a test that looks
for the state where the last event necessary for rights to vest in the injured party
occurred (lex loci delicti). Neither the Hubbard test's first prong nor the traditional
lex loci delicti test require any thoughtful consideration of whether it is the right
law to apply---each approach more often than not blindly applies the law of the
situs. The Hubbard court's unwillingness to consider whether other interested
states have a more significant relationship to a dispute in which the situs bears just
more than a little connection is difficult to explain. It can be assumed that the court
was not actually ready to step away from the traditional doctrine. This facet of the
test is too rigid and should be replaced with a looser presumption, similar to those
actually found in the Restatement (Second), which may be displaced when a court
finds that another state has a more significant relationship to the suit.
C. Grouping-of-Contacts Should be Supplemented or Replaced by Interest Analysis
As discussed above, the second prong of the Hubbard test can fairly be
characterized as a grouping-of-contacts analysis. 255 Once the place of the tort is
found to bear little connection to the dispute, a court can simply add up each state's
contacts to see which state has the most contacts with the dispute, without making
any policy consideration. A state may have several contacts with a dispute, but it
doesn't necessarily follow that all those contacts are relevant or important to the
resolution of the dispute. This choice-of-law technique has not become the
254. 543 N.E.2d 680 (Ind. App. 1989).
255. The grouping-of-contacts or center-of-gravity approach were the names given to
the most significant relationship test in its early form. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN
CONFLICTs LAW 264 (4th ed. 1986).
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dominant method for making conflict of laws resolutions for good reasons.
Professor Brainerd Currie lamented:
The trouble with the [grouping-of-contacts] theory is that the quest
... that it enjoined was not implemented by any standard according to
which significance could be determined .... "The 'contacts' are totted
up and a highly subjective fiat is issued to the effect that one group of
contacts or the other is more significant. The reasons for the conclusion
are too elusive for objective evaluation. '" 256
Although the judicial opinions on which Currie was commenting may not have
simply looked at the aggregate of the contacts in each state as he may have
257believed, he was indeed anticipating what the Hubbard decision allows to occur
in Indiana courts: a quantitative assessment of sets of contacts with no regard to the
social policy behind the states' laws.
Of course, a court should identify all the contacts that each interested state has
with the dispute; however, this process is meaningless without further identification
of the social policies behind those laws. All laws have some purpose, policy, or
social aim that should not be ignored when determining whether that law should
control a given situation. Once the policy behind a law has been identified, a court
should look to see if applying that law to a given dispute will realize that policy. If
not, the law's purpose will not be realized by its application, there is no legitimate
reason to apply that law. It can be argued that the grouping-of-contacts test may
more often than not call for the application of the same law that would be chosen
under a test involving governmental interest analysis; however, without a proper
consideration of the policy behind the law, there is no certainty that the proper law
will indeed be applied in all instances.
D. Grouping-of-Contacts Lacks a Tie Breaker
The quantitative tie found in Simon v. United States underscores the main
argument of the Note-a court can struggle with a choice-of-law analysis that
makes no reference to the qualitative principles of section 6. One may argue that
the Indiana Supreme Court's earlier choice-of-law decisions could be resolved
without reference to the principles of section 6; however, the Hubbard test does not
provide the framework for answering Simon's choice-of-law questions. As noted
above, the parties in Simon have agreed that the place of injury is not relevant and
the court has found that Indiana and Pennsylvania have an equal quantitative
interest in the dispute. Section 6 provides the framework for the Indiana Supreme
Court to determine whether Indiana or Pennsylvania has the most significant
relationship to the dispute through policy analysis. The court's research will reveal
whether the social policies behind each state's law will be advanced by the
application of that law to this case.
256. Cavers et al., supra note 3, at 1233 (quoting Brainerd Currie, Conflict, Crisis and
Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 40).
257. Id. at 265. Currie made these comments about Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441
(N.Y. 1961) and even the much heralded Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 (1963).
LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 255, at 265 n.4.
[Vol.79:533
2004] INDIANA'S MISAPPLICATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 565
CONCLUSION
The Hubbard test was an improvement over the traditional application of the
lex loci delicti approach. However, whether the Hubbard test was a significant
improvement over the traditional lex loci delicti approach is greatly in doubt. The
tremendous presumption given to the law of the situs does not deviate greatly from
the traditional rule. In the rare case that the presumption that the law of the situs
controls is displaced, "[t]he contacts are totted up and a highly subjective fiat is
issued to the effect that one group of contacts or the other is more significant.,
258
A fair look at the Hubbard test and its progeny in light of the omission of
interest analysis reveals that Indiana is not a Restatement (Second) jurisdiction. The
language of the Hubbard opinion indicates an implicit disapproval of one of the
Restatement (Second)'s core pillars-section 6's general principles which include
interest analysis. "It bears re-emphasis that all other sections of the Restatement
ultimately trace back to section 6," thereby referring to interest analysis in every
section. 259 The Indiana Supreme Court has given no rationale for excluding section
6 from its choice-of-law analysis and cannot claim to be applying the Restatement
(Second) in its intended form.
Because of the omission of any form of governmental interest analysis, Indiana
courts may apply the law of a state whose underlying purpose behind that law is
not being advanced. The Indiana Supreme Court took a small step forward in
Hubbard, but the court must go further in Simon v. United States if it desires to be
aligned with modem conflict of laws theory. If the court is not content with the
Restatement (Second) in its entirety, perhaps the court will allow some form of
policy analysis in its choice-of-law decisionmaking. Policy analysis, by way of
section 6, has been incorporated into the vast majority of modem choice-of-law
doctrines.260 Without a consideration of whether the social policies and goals of a
law are being advanced, the Hubbard test fails to truly ask whether it is proper for a
court to apply a certain law. This denies the purposive nature of law. Every time a
court is making a choice-of-law decision, it should ask whether the given law's
underlying social policy will be advanced by its application to the case. Without
such an inquiry, judges are carrying out the "highly subjective fiat" Professor
Currie feared and this cannot be reconciled with modem choice-of-law theory. 261
The Indiana Supreme Court should take advantage of the opportunity in Simon v.
United States to improve the working operation of Indiana conflicts law for torts by
including the policy analysis of section 6 thereby aligning itself with modem
choice-of-law theory.
258. See LEFLAR El AL., supra note 255, at 265 (quoting Brainerd Currie, Comment on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233 (1963) [hereinafter Currie, Comment];
Brainerd Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 40
[hereinafter Currie, Conflict]).
259. M. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the
Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REv. 653, 659 (1995). The sections dealing with
particular torts that don't explicitly refer to section 6 in their text generally refer to section
145, which requires consideration of section 6's general principles. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 146-74 (1971).
260. See supra note 85.
261. LEFLAR, supra note 254, at 265 (quoting Currie, Comment, supra note 257; Currie,
Conflict, supra note 257, at 40).

